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D.S.P. MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE
•
Denis O'Connor's article in the first
issue of The Democratic Socialist
contains one mistaken quotation in
respect of Resolution E2 (which both of
us supported at the February 1983 DSP
Conference), and several misconceptions
regarding the content and purpose of
DSP Policy Statement E3 on the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (against which he
spoke at that Conference).
As regards resolution E2, DSP proposal
(f) as adopted by the Conference,
actually reads as follows:-
"The return to the Arabs of territories
occupied after the 1967 war, thereby
providing the land on which the
Palestinian people are entitled to
establish a state of their own".
As regards the DSP Policy Statement,
Denis O'Connor sums up his criticism of
it as follows:-
"In summary the presentation of the
subject in E3 is essentially pro-Zionist
and anti-Arab."
Sincethe charge of being "pro-Zionist and
an ti-Arab" has been used by both the
trendy New Left and the pro-Soviet Old
Left for the purpose of inducing a very
definite reflex reaction among
socialists, one might be tempted to
defend the DSP Policy Statement by
indignantly and immediately denying any
such charge - lock, stock and barrel.
In order to highlight the complexities
of the issues raised however, I will
limit my immediate response to a quite
emphatic denial that the policy can in
any respect be regarded as anti-Arab.
The charge of being "pro-Zionist" is in
effect a more meaningless one, rather
akin to the charge that the DSP Policy
on Northern Ireland is "pro-British" or
even "West British". It is, however,
worth looking at some of the wide
variety of possible meanings of the
"pro-Zionist" charge before deciding on
whether or not such a description has
any actual application to the DSP
Policy Statement.
WHAT DOES "PRO-ZIONIST" MEAN?
"Pro-Zionist" has now become one of
those stock left-wing curse words that
is more often than not designed to
silence an opponent rather than encourage
an un-biased examination of what
political developments are required for
a just solution to a very complex
national conflict. One of the corres-
ponding right-wing curse-words which
leaves me equally unmoved is "terrorist".
My objection to the P.L.O. is not that
it employs "terrorist" methods of
struggle, but that the ultimate objective
of that struggle is the liquidation of
the State of Israel. If the P.L.O. was
genuinely prepared to limit its objectives
to the establishment of a West Bank
State guaranteeing both peace and
security to the neighbouring State of
Israel, the P.L.O. 's use of "terrorist"
methods of struggle against the Israeli
occupation would not in the least deter
me from supporting them in their
pursuit of such a revised objective.
Unfortunately, however, the P.L.O. has
set its face more firmly than ever
against any such revision.
What does it mean to say that the D.S.P.
Policy Statement is "pro-Zionist"? If
"Zionism" is taken to mean the
continued Israeli occupation and settle-
ment of the West Bank, well then the
D.S.P. would have to be described as
decidedly "anti-Zionist". What if the
term Zionism is more realistically
widened to embrace the policies of the
Opposition Labour Party? That Party
calls for Israeli withdrawal from the
West Bank but also speaks of the
resulting Arab sovereignty over the
regained West Bank territories as con-
stituting part of a Jordanian-Palestinian
State which must embrace the East Bank
as well. Accordingly, it would still
be a total misrepresentation of the
D.S.P. Policy Statement to describe it
as "pro-Zionist", since our Party is
quite explicit about its support for the
principle of an independent Palestinian
State on the West Bank. But Zionism
cannot be given even that limiting
definition. Zionism per se is notbing
more or less than the belief in an
independent Israeli State. It is an
Israeli's attitude to the corresponding
issue of an independent Palestinian
State which then defines what kind of
Zionist he/she is. For example, the
Programme of the democratic socialist
Shelli Party for Peace and Equality,
which was confirmed at its Congress in
May of this year, states the following
set of principles:-
"Zionism is the national liberation
movement of the Jewish people. It
expresses the will of Jews to concentrate
in their homeland and to live and to
prosper as a part of the family of
nations. It expresses the wish to have
self-sovereignty in the State of Israel
The Shelli Party sees itself as a
full partner to the Zionist aims ...
Shelli thinks that the Palestinian
people have an equal right, as do the
Jews, for self-determination •.. The
Jewish members of Shelli are Zionists.
Their immediate aim is to rescue Zionism
from the chauvinistic right wing that
drowns it in an ocean of settlements in
the conquered areas, and in annexations
The Arab members of Shelli are
Israeli citizens by their status and
Palestinian by their natiOnality. They
identify themselves with their people's
wish for self-determination alongside
Israel •.• "
" ..• Shelli sees the conflict in the
Middle East and in particular the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a dis-
agreement between two national movements
that have the same country as their
territorial base. Shelli thinks that
this dispute can only be solved by
partition of the country .•. The
political solution shall be based on the
mutual recognition of the national
rights of both peoples. Shelli desires
peace on the following lines:- An
Israeli recognition of the Palestinian
right for self-determination and its
right for a state of its own side by
side with Israel; ... As part of the
peace agreement Israel will hand back to
the Palestinians the territories which
were conquered during the Six Day War in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, so
they will have the possibility to build
their own state there .....
Now perhaps a case could be made for
describing D.S.P. policy as "pro-Zionist ..
in the Shelli sense, since both demo-
cratic socialist parties believe in a
similar peaceful solution which would
result in a Palestinian West Bank State
alongside the State of Israel. But an
equally strong case could be made for
describing D.S.P. policy as "pro-
Palestinian nationalist" in line with
the thinking of the former P.L.O. leader
Issam Sartawi, who was murdered earlier
this year. In reality, while concerned
with finding a just solution that will
recognise the rights of both peoples, the
D.S.P. policy is not bound up emotionally
with the national sentiments and aspira-
tions of either side. I would still
maintain that our policy remains "non-
Zionist", even in the Shelli sense.
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A POLICY STATEMENT FOR AN IRISH AUDIENCE
The fact that the tone of the D.S.P.
policy statement avoids the use of
language which could be used to generate
an emotional involvement on either side
of the conflict is perhaps another
factor which leads Denis O'eonnor to some
misconceptions concerning the character
of that policy. He objects .'
that the quotations which it contains
take no account of "the grievances
suffered" . That is not true. There is
explicit reference to the grievances
currently being suffered by the
Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied
West Bank, when we denounce the Israeli
government for purSUing "a policy of
increased repression of its overwhelm-
ingly Arab majority alongside a plan for
more and more JewiSh settlements,
having as its Ultimate objective the
formal annexation of these Palestinian
Arab territories".
It is true that the Policy Statement
does not contain a recitation of thOse
Palestinian grievances suffered forty
years ago, but neither does it contain
any mention of that unique crime of
forty years ago, the Holocaust inftkted
on the Jewish people. Our policy state-
ment was for the purpose of influencing
Irish public opinion on the requirements
for Middle East peace, and it took the
strength of grievance on both the
Jewish and Arab sides as given. Had we
been directing our policy statement at a
primarily Jewish audience we should
certainly have highlighted Zionist
injustices to the Palestinian Arabs in
previous decades, including the 1948
massacre of Deir Yassin Villagers
carried out by Begin's forces. Had we
been addressing an Arab aUdience, there
would have been an even greater need to
draw out the full implications of the
Holocaust, including the support given
by the leader of the Palestinian Arabs,
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, to
Hitler's "Final Solution of the JeWish
Question".
Since the D.S.P. was in fact addressing
an Irish audience, we took account of
the fact that Irish pUblic opinion is
already very much in tune with the
Palestinian sense of grievance as well
as of the fact that the Workers' Party
and most other Irish left-wing groups
are not only uncritical supporters of




very existence of any Israeli state.
Moreover, ever since the pro-P.L.O.
statement made in Bahrein by Brian
Lenihan in his capacity as the
Fianna Fail Government's Foreign
Minister, both Ireland and Greece
have constituted the European Community's
two member states that are most suppor-
tive of the Palestinian cause and most
responsive to the Arab lobby. Irish
Government policy continues to uneqUivo-
cally advocate the right of the
Palestinians to have their own sovereign
state. As the Coalition Government's
Foreign Minister Peter Barry stated in
the Dail on July 3 of this year:-
"Our diplomatic efforts, through
European Political Co-operation and at
the U.N., have in recent times of
necessity focussed upon the urgent
question of the rights of the Palestinian
people ... We accept the right of that
people to self-determination with all
that that implies. The creation of a
Palestinian homeland, a state - the
precise model is a matter for negotiations
and for the Palestinians themselves -
is an essential element of a solution
that would be just and lasting •..
Israel's rights do not extend to the
implantation of settler colonies in the
West Bank and Gaza".
In fact the Irish Foreign Minister
professed a very definite emotional
entanglement when he also proclaimed
that outside of Europe and North America
"no part of the world is closer to us in
terms of geography or of political and
trading links than those countries which
together make up the Arab nation". He
argued that "the links between the Arab
world and Europe are older and
deeper than any forged by a twentieth
century oil crisis".
Would it have helped matters if the D.S.P.
Policy Statement had also worn our
emotions on its sleeve? To be fair, if
we had provided ample quotes on "the
grievances suffered" we would have to
had done so for both sides. If that
were so, Denis O'Connor's own references
to "the awful flight of European Jews"
and to "the Jews escaping oppression in
their own countries" could hardly be
taken as adequate recognition of both
the enormity and unique character of the
Holocaust. The scientifically planned
and methodically executed "Final
Solution" of six million Jews a mere
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forty years ago was a crime of genocide
without parallel. As a result of the
Jewish people's struggle to guarantee
their future survival in a state of
their own, Palestinian rights were
indeed violated by Zionists. But to
present . _ .. .' those violations, or even
the emergence in 1948 of a half million
Palestinian refugees during the course
of the first Arab-Israeli War, as an
injustice that was unique for those
years, would be quite misleading. It
was in fact the expansion of the Socialist
States for purposes of both territorial
aggrandisement and security that created
the overwhelming bulk of the refugee
problem that followed from World War 11.
Far more violations of human and national
rights have been perpetrated in the name
of Socialism than Zionism can even be
charged with. The Socialist label is
perhaps one requiring an even more
detailed response from a Democratic
Socialist Party as to how it reconciles
its socialist principles with respect
for democratic rights.
THE POLISH ROAD TO SOCIALISM
I am totally opposed to the Zionist
occupation of the town of Hebron on the
Palestinian West Bank, even though
there had been a continuous Jewish
presence there until a pogromist massacre
by Arabs first obliterated that presence
fifty-odd years ago. But in 1945 parts
of Germany that had been nothing but
German for over a thousand years, as
well as other areas that were predominant-
ly German, were "emptied" of their
indigenous populations and planted by
Slav settlers. Three million Sudeten
Germans (as well as 700,000 Hungarians)
were uprooted from their ancestral home-
lands by the Czechoslovak Government. A
further ten million Germans were driven
out of territories annexed by the Soviet
Union and Poland. The historic German
city of Konigsberg, famous as the birth-
place of the philosopher Immanuel Kant,
was "emptied" of its 300,000 men, women
and children so that it could be trans-
formed into the Soviet city of Kaliningrad.
The German city of Breslau became the
Polish ci ty of Wroclaw, Danzig became
Gdansk, etc. On May 20, 1945 the
Communist Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka
summed up the policy of the new Socialist
Poland as follows:-
"Resettlement:- Polonization is
important, because the acquisition of
the western te.rri tories is one of the
arguments we are using in seeking the
support of society. If there is no
Polish population there, the administra-
tion will be in the hands of the Red Army.
We must expel all the Germans because
countries are built on national lines and
not on multi-national ones ••• During the
current year the entire German population
must be removed ... We must settle there
three and a half million Poles •.. "
Other Polish communists were anxious to
go rather further, but Gomulka demurred:-
"Another area where sectarian errors have
developed is Security ... Comrade
Korczynski in Gdansk is preparing crema-
toria for Germans. This is Gestapo
tactics .•. "
frhiS was but a mild rebuke from Gomulka
to one of his closest comrade-in-arms,
whom he was always at pains to protect.
Korczynski had commanded a partisan group
of Polish communists during the Nazi
occupation. But not just against the
Germans. It was only in the late 1940s,
after Gomulka had been ousted from the
Party leadership, that a Jewish communist
in the Polish diplomatic service felt
secure enough to reveal another feature
of Korczynski's approach to the "national
question". A Jewish partisan group, that
had also been engaged in guerilla warfare
against the Nazis near the city of Lublin,
sought assistance from Korczynski's
larger Polish group. His response was
to order the slaughter of all forty
Jewish guerrillas. The future diplomat
alone had survived by pretending to be
dead. As a result of these revelations
Korczynski was tried in camera and
imprisoned - but only for a few years.
In 1956 Gomulka returned to power and
ordered his immediate release. After-
wards he was rapidly promoted and reached
the position of Deputy Minister of
Defence. In December 1970 General
Korczynski repaid the debt by carrying
out a job that this time Gomulka himself
had particularly commissioned for Gdansk.
When a wave of strikes broke out all over
Poland in protest against massive price
rises, Gomulka entrusted Korczynski with
directing the repressive measures to be
taken against the workers. Hundreds of
Polish workers were massacred as a result.]
Gomulka felt that Korczynski's proposals
for the mass extermination of German
civilians would not be necessary in
either Gdansk or any other annexed German
territory. He argued that it would be
quite possible and sufficient to
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forcibly uproot eight million men, women
and children from their ancestral home-
land in Eastern Germany and drive them
westwards beyond the Oder and Neisse
rivers of Central Germany. As he summed
up on May 21, 1945.upon the conclusion
of that Party debate:-
"The Western Territories:- A guard must
be put on the frontier, the Germans must
be expelled and those who stay must get
the kind of treatment that will not
encourage them to stay ..• We should
simply clear out the Germans and build a
national state".
As for other minorities in Socialist
Poland, Gomulka also went on to warn in
the very next breath of that same speech,
delivered in the immediate aftermath of
the Holocaust:-
"The work of the Personnel Department
must be improved and the party purged
The director of the Personnel Department
in Krakow took in two thousand people, all
obviously Jews by their appearance and
speaking Polish with a poor accent. This
was a cheap trick, but it is difficult to
say to what extent it was sectarianism
and to what extent sabotage "
Yiddish had indeed been the native lan-
guage of the Polish Jewish community
which numbered three and a half million
people in 1939. But that community had
been rooted in Poland for many hundreds
of years. Three million of them perished
in the Holocaust. In 1968 Gomulka, ably
assisted by Korczynski, mounted a vicious
anti-semitic campaign under the guise of
"anti-Zionism". The thirty thousand
surviving Jews who had remained on in
Poland and who were overwhelmingly
Communist in their loyalties, were
finally expelled by their Socialist
homeland.
HELSINKI SOLUTIONS AND AGREEMENTS
Perhaps a more favourable comparison for
the Palestinians might be dispossessed
Finns rather than dispossessed Germans.
For over a century Finland had been an
oppressed nation within the Russian
Empire. In 1917 it took advantage of the
revolutionary turmoil in Russia in order
to regain its independence. In 1939,
however, the Soviet Union sought to
enhance the security of Leningrad by
demanding the annexation of the nearby
Finnish province of Karelia, even though
there was no eth~ic basis for any such
claim. When the Finnish Government
refused to yield up its native territory,
•
the Soviet Union bombed Helsinki and
invaded Finland. At a U.N. Conference on
Refugees in 1958, the Finnish delegate
explained what finally happened the
natives of Karelia:-
"In 1944 the 3,300,000 people who lived
within the present boundaries of Finland
had to receive in a couple of weeks' time
around 440,000 displaced persons, all
Finnish citizens who had left their home-
steads after the new frontier line had
cut off some 13 per cent of our territory
from the rest of Finland".
European Socialism - while it might
qUietly acknowledge that millions of
Germans and Finnish civilians had indeed
suffered such grievances and injustices -
has nonetheless set i~s face against
any agitation to restore the rights of
the dispossessed. Any claims for a
return of such annexed territories to
their original inhabitants have been
denounced as revanchist warmongering.
Finland's Social-Democratic leader
Kekkonen was long ago placed on a Peace
Movement pedestal for steadfastly refus-
ing to harp on any Finnish version of the
"oppressed nation" tune and for concluding
instead the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of
Friendship and Mutual Co-operation. West
Germany's Social-Democratic Chancellor
Willy Brandt was similarly hailed as
peacemaker when he journeyed to Warsaw in
1970 in order to sign a Treaty with
Gomulka which confirmed German acceptance
of the territorial integrity of the new
Poland whose western frontiers extended
to the Oder-Neisse rivers. The 1975
Helsinki Agreement on European Security
took absolutely no account of the past
grievances of either "bad" Germans or
"good" Finns when the States of Europe
agreed to recognise and freeze all exist-
ing national frontiers, inclUding the
territorial integrity of Poland and the
Soviet Union which was based on massive
aIDlexations a mere thirty years previously.
A few years ago, when Socialists Against
Nationalism was established as a precursor
of the Democratic Socialist Party, Denis
O'Connor was among those most insistent
that SAN should invoke the principles of
the Helzinki Agreement as a key argument
for "freezing the Irish border as well.
I do not believe in one set of standards
for Europe and another for the Middle
East. I think it would be inexcusably
patronising for democratic socialists to
refrain from condemning the P.L.O.
Covenant's objective of completely
liqUidating the State of Israel, on
account of the fact that the Palestinians
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are an oppressed nation. Denis O'Connor
argues that we should not "tar the
oppressed with the same brush as the
oppressor". If our approach to politics
had been imprisoned by that over-riding
concern neither Socialists Against
Nationalism nor the Democratic Socialist
Party itself would ever have been founded.
After all, certainly since 1798,Protestant
Ulster was never an oppressed nation
whereas Catholic Ireland was. Protestant
Ulster has never once experienced
oppression at the hands of Catholic
Ireland, it has "merely" been threatened
with such oppression. And for fifty years
it could be said that the Catholics of
Derry were denied full democratic rights
by those very Ulster Protestants whose
right to self-determination both SAN and
the DSP have been most insistent on
being recognised by all Catholics, whether
past victims of discrimination or not.
We adopted that approach precisely
because we were not the patronising left,
but on the contrary a socialist movement
which was prepared to honestly confront
the fact that even though the RepUblic's
annexationist claims to Northern Ireland
in Articles 2 and 3 were unlikely to be
actively pursued by any Irish Government
and would in any case be impossible to
enforce, their retention in our Constitu-
tion was a major cause of the Northern
conflict.
THE DEAD-END OF "REVOLUTIONARY" RHETORIC
Does an uncritical attitude towards the
claims of oppressed nations help or hinder
them in achieving reasonable national
objectives, such as the return of the
West Bank to Arab sovereignty? During
the 1967 War no left-wing group had been
more vehemently anti-Zionist than the
British and Irish Communist Organisation,
which even denounced the whole tradition
of the Israeli Labour Movement as
"social-Fascist". When B & ICO publica-
tions began to come to terms with reality
rather than rhetoric on such matters,
there was an indignant reader's letter
pUblished in Communist Comment on
November 21, 1970. The reader protested:-
"I was extremely disappointed with the
article by John Harkin on Palestine in
the September 19, Communist Comment.
It would seem to me that with regard to
an anti-imperialist struggle ... the
first task is solidarity with that
struggle ... The 1947 U.N. Partition
resolution (unfortunately supported by
the Soviet Union) setting up the State of
Israel, violated the right to self-
determination of the Palestinians by
g1v1ng it to a people who were not
entitled to it ... The fact is that the
State of Israel must be destroyed for the
Palestinians to return home and exercise
their right to self-determination. The
struggle at the moment is for the right
of self-determination for the oppressed
nation - the Palestinian Arabs. It is
only in the context of support for this
struggle that one can then raise the
question of self-determination for the
oppressor nation. Support for the former
struggle must not be conditional on
acceptance of the latter position".
Such "revolutionary solidarity" did
sweet damn all to help the Palestinians
achieve the only objective that was
realisable - a Palestinian State on the
West Bank prepared to abandon all further
territorial claims on the State of Israel.
I was the author of the particular piece
of New Left gobbldegook that is quoted
above, at a time when my primary political
involvement was in assisting Palestinians
with denunciations of Israel's very
existence at various meetings on the
American East Coast. It took me qUite
some time to break free from the legacy
of that type of sentimental solidarity,
which was utterly counterproductive for
the people in whom false hopes were
thereby perpetuated. Indeed it was only
with the greatest reluctance that I came
around to ultimately agree with the
policy statement on the Jewish-Arab
conflict which the B & ICO formulated in
December 1973, in an attempt to persuade
left-wing opinion to recognise a two
states solution to the conflict as the
only attainable objective.
Where has all the uncritical "solidarity"
with P.L.O. objectives left the Palestinians
except in a greater predicament than ever
before? When they were being either
bombed or massacred in Beirut. Syria and
the rest of their most rhetorical Arab
supporters stood idly by. Could the
P.L.O. absorb any lessons from'this
experience? There was one P.L.O. leader
who attempted to do so. Issam Sartawi is
believed to have been among those who
planned the "Black September" massacre of
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics
in 1972. Four years later. however. he
proved to be the only Palestinian leader
willing to engage in meaningful dialogue
with an Israeli group that unequivocally
champions a Palestinian West Bank State
alongside Israel - the Council for Israeli-
Palestinian Peace. When the P.L.O. 's
Parliament. the Palestinian National
Council, met in Algiers in February of
this year. Sartawi planned to deliver a
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speech which would call for the expansion
of a dialogue with Israelis and which
would declare support for a compromise
peace whereby both Israel and the P.L.O.
should each recognise the other side's
right to independent statehood. Through
a parliamentary manoeuvre, however.
Sartawi was denied his right to speak
before the Council. Resigning from the
P.N.C. in protest. Sartawi declared:-
"It was outrageous that all of the
secretaries-general of the different
P.L.O. organisations painted a picture of
Lebanon as a glowing Victory. Lebanon
was a disaster. I bow my head to the
courage of the people who fought there.
But if Beirut was such a great Victory,
then all we need is a series of such
victories and we will be holding our
next national council meeting in Fiji".
In April of this year Sartawi was
murdered by a Syrian-based Palestinian
faction who proudly acknowledged their
"achievement". Unable to confront even
this reality. Yasser Arafat attributed
Sartawi's murden to "Zionist agents"
rather than blame Syria. Two months
later Syria took over the P.L.O. units
in Syrian-occupied Lebanon and roundly
trounced Arafat's men.
THE D.S.P. AND THE PEACE STRUGGLE
The purpose of the D.S.P. Policy Statement
on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is to
pinpoint the two-states solution as the
only just and democratic outcome possible;
to assess the intransigent dogmas on both
the Jewish and Arab sides which stand as
an obstacle to such a solution; and to
recognise those forces that are contribut-
ing towards movement in the direction of
that just solution. Until another Sartawi
emerges on the Palestinian side, it is
regrettable that there will be no Arab
eqUivalent of Israel's "Peace Now"
movement. Denis O'Connor is quite wrong
to suggest that Begin's concept of West
Bank "autonomy" is compatible with the
"Peace Now" programme. On the contrary,
that programme requires a complete
surrender of Israeli sovereignty over the
West Bank territories which should be
returned to Arab sovereignty following
re-partition. The broad-based "Peace
Now" lDovement has made the maximum
possible contribution towards mass
mobilisation for a just solution. It is.
of course. necessary for its individual
political components to push the issues
still :further. (As a supporter of "Peace
Now". the Israeli Council for Israeli-
Palestinian Peace continues its own
independent, radical campaign for a West
Bank Palestinian State). The principal
party behind "Peace Now" is the United
•
Workers' Party - Mapam (with six Jewish
M.P.s and one Arab M.P. in the Israeli
Parliament). The Mapam Party's own
"Peace Platform" as confirmed in
February of this year states:-
"Mapam will strive for a solution based
upon two independent, sovereign countries;
one, the State of Israel and the other a
Jordanian-Palestinian state. The
majority of the population of Jordan is
made up of Palestinians. They and their
brothers and sisters in the West Bank
share the same language and tradition
and their family ties are many and
extended. The expanse of such a
Jordanian-Palestinian state would make
it possible for the Palestinian people
to realise its right to self-determination,
to preserve its unity, to absorb its
refugees and to observe the right of
Israel to secure and recognised borders
through security agreements and a
demilitarised zone. This would not be
possible if a third state were established
between Israel and Jordan. With the
accomplishment of peace, Israel will not
determine the political life of the
Jordanians and Palestinians and she will
respect their democratic decisions in
everything pertaining to their indepen-
dence and sovereignty within their borders
"
Now this platform contains many contradic-
tions. While in the first part it views
a separate West Bank State as illogical,
in the second part it implicitly
recognises that such a separate state
might indeed emerge subsequent to
Israeli withdrawal. A separate West Bank
State is illogical only if it is assumed
that the Palestinians have either the
will or the way to also achieve majority
rule on the East Bank of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. But the P.L.O. is not
a revolutionary organisation. If a
Palestinian leadership would settle for
self-determination on the West Bank alone,
and would be content to leave the East
Bank's Palestinian majority under King
Hussein's minority rule, its wishes would
have to be respected. The Mapam platform
is inadequate but it is at least
subject to extremely Vigorous criticism
and a political struggle to radicalise
it still further, not least in Mapam's
Own publications.
A final note on where the D.S.P. Policy
Statement and Resolutions have gone in
that context. While primarily aimed at
an Irish audience, they have also been
communicated to contacts among the left-
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wing of Palestinian nationalis~ on the
occupied West Bank, as well as to the
Mapam and Shelli Parties, "Peace Now" and
the Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace
in Israel. D.S.P. Resolutions El and E2,
calling for a Palestinian State on the
West Bank, have been reproduced in full
in New York's Jewish Socialist newspaper,
the Morning Freiheit. The D.S.P. 's two
state arguments have also been presented
in Ya'ad, an EngliSh pUblication of
Young Poale Zion (youth wing of the
Labour Zionist Movement). More signifi-
cant has been the request by a Mapam
pUblication, Israel Horizons, for an
exposition of the D.S.P. approach. In
the final paragraph of my article for
Israel Horizons, I sum up:-
It goes without saying that while the
D.S.P. gives full recognition to the broad
progressive character of "Peace Now", our
own support for the establishment of a
Palestinian State on the West Bank, living
in peace side-by-side with Israel, would
lead us to adopt a more critical attitude
concerning the inadequacies of the main
parties of the Israeli left in that respect.
This criticism would apply to Mapam as well
as to the Israeli Labour Party. If
Palestinian politics can develop to the
point of recognising and guaranteeing peace
to the State of Israel, it will be no
business of democratic socialist politics in
Israel to suggest that the West Bank and Gaza
should constitute part of a Jordanian-
Palestinian State rather than exist as a
quite separate Palestinian State. We would
fUlly support the call by Meir Pa'il in the
March-April 1983 issue of Israel Horizons -
that in the event of any Palestinian leader-
ship being willing to negotiate with Israel,
there should be a declaration that "the
State of Israel views with favour the
establishment of a Palestinian state on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip". HopefUlly such a
viewpoint will gather further strength among
Israeli socialists so that a more forceful
struggle can be waged for partition as the
only valid democratic solution which will
guarantee the right to self-determination
of both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs".
D.S.P. Policy on the Middle East has been
established for less than a year, but in my
view it has enabled us to make a more serious
contribution to the political struggle for
recognition of the Palestinians right to
independent statehood than has the decade
and a half of uncritical support for the
P.L.O. which most of the Irish left has
given in line with its traditional fondness
for counterproductive rhetoric.
Manus O'Riordan




Repartition in Ireland is inevitable. It
is no longer a question of whether: it is
a question of when and how. Ideally, all
the Nationalists would be brought in a
peaceful and orderly manner under the
authority of the Irish Government, while
all the Unionists remained citizens of the
U.K. Politicians in Britain and Ireland
should aim to approach this ideal solution
as closely as possible.
The Unionists cannot be forced into a
United Ireland. The Nationalists cannot
for very much longer be forced into the
United Kingdom. Only a settlement which
guarantees each community its national
freedom can be just or effective. An
attempted settlement on any other basis will
only make matters worse.
The two communiti~s have incompatible notions
of freedom. Any political system where they
are forced to co-exist will give liberty
without security to 60% and leave 40%
oppressed - as is the case at present - or
vice versa. Liberty for one is bondage
for the other. Unless they are free of each
other the Nationalists and the Unionists
cannot both be fre~.
No system to which both communities belong
can truthfully be called democratic. In
reality it will be a system of apartheid
where the state either openly promotes, or
tacitly sanctions, the subordination of
one separately developing community to the
other. Such an apartheid system exists today
in Northern Ire.land, despite the fact that
there is a well-developed Unionist democratic
process. Such an apartheid system would
exist in a United Ireland if that
political unit could be constructed.
In recent times at least, the state has
not favoured apartheid in Northern Ireland,
but is powerless against the popular demand
for it. Both communities are busily c~eating
facts. It is by no mere habit that Unionists
and Nationalists go to school, work, worship,
socialise, play games, organise politically,
reside and marry apart. During the past
fifteen years they have applied themselves
with enthusiasm to destroying the patches of
common ground that previously existed. What
has happened in mixed residential areas is
well known. A less obvious example is the
fate of the NILP. Socialist Unionists and
Socialist Nationalists no longer find it
possible to share a flag of convenience, as
they did previously.
The Unionists and Nationalists do not
share a political experience. It is not
possible to describe Northern Ireland in
a way that significant sections of both
communities will recognise as valid. For
example, is Northern Ireland a colony?
Protestant Northern Ireland most certainly
is not a colony: it is an integral part
of the United Kingdom. Catholic
Northern Ireland most certainly is a
colony: it is occupied Ireland. Again,
how should one describe the British Army?
In Woodvale and Larne it is the national
defence force. In Ballymurphy and Creggan
it is a foreign army of occupation.
There is no political force in Britain or
Ireland which can exert sufficient
attractive power on both Northern
Communities to offset their mutual
repulsion. A few.years ago, when it was
not clear what would emerge from the social
ferment in Britain, it was possible to
think that the British Labour Party might
become such a force. The idea that it
is ~ such a force, even in its pitiful
aimless condition, is the illusion of a
liberal Unionist fringe. It is an illusion
that the vast majority of Unionists,
whether liberal or not, do not share.
Many of them take some interest in the
campaign for Labour Party organisation in
Northern Ireland, but only because it can
spoil a forum for Nationalist propaganda
in Britain.
In case there is any ambiguity in the way
I have presented the problem up to now,
I will spell it out again. Northern Ireland
is ripped apart, and made nonsensical not
only as a political unit but even as a
province of any single political unit, by
a conflict of national allegiance.
Between 900,000 and a million Unionists
wish to remain part of the United Kingdom
and will not accept a United Ireland.
Between half a million and 600,000
Nationalists wish to be part of a United
Ireland and will not accept the United
Kingdom. Catholics are Nationalists and
Protestants are Unionists. Politically
the few exceptions do not count.
Northern Ireland is the territory where
the British and Irish nations are
intertangled. Although I follow the common
practice of calling the communities
Nationalists and Unionists, in fact both
the communities are nationalist, though
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they give their commitments to different
nationals. The Nationalists are Irish
nationalists; the Unionists are British
nationalists. Throughout modern history
the national identity has always been
cherished in each community as prior and
superior to class interest, common Chris-
tianity, common Irishness or whatever.
One may safely expect that this will not
change in the near future.
It is futile to question either community,
whether seriously or ironically, about what
composes its national identity. The
national political system of one community
cannot be shaped in such a way as to placate
or to smother the national aspirations of
the other. Nationality is not something
that can be summed up in one or two social
and cultural features. (A fallacy on which
the New Ireland Forum is based). It
courses through all channels of life in
Northern Ireland, replenishing the hostility
of each nation for the other.
The national conflict tends to intensify
as time goes on. It is not abated by the
process of secularisation, which takes
place separately in each community without
forging any alliances across the divide.
For example, the elected representatives of
the Northern Nationalists expressed them-
selves as follows on the recent anti-
abortion amendment: Sinn Fein, against;
SDLP 50/50 for and against. It is plain
that these parti s have been influenced
by secularist thinking without being softened
in their attitudes to Unionism.
There are Unionists who claim that large
numbers of Catholics are content with the
Union. The DSP policy Statement repeats
this claim, which is entirely bogus. If
there were large numbers of Catholics who
were content with the Union, as a matter of
course they would vote for the Alliance
Party which was set up precisely so that
Catholics who were content with the Union
need no longer be disenfranchised. And
if for some reason they chose not to vote
for the Alliance Party (but why?) they would,
of course, abstain.
In this year's Westminster election the SDLP
got 20%; Sinn Fein 13%; the Workers'
Party (still identified by both communities,
correctly in my view, as nationalist), about
3%. That does not leave a great deal of
the Catholic vote that could have gone to,
the Alliance Party (plus Gerry Fitt, for
whom Alliance stood down). 3% - 4% of
the total vote, perhaps; at most one
tenth of the Catholic vote.
Perhaps one tenth of the Catholics are
content, then, with the Union. Was
there ever a colony where one tenth of
the natives did not prefer to make the
best of the colonial regime, rather than
to suffer the hardship and disruption
that attends revolution? Far more than
a tenth of the Irish Catholics were
content with the Union in 1918. When
one considers the uniquely vulnerable
position of the Northern Catholics as a
colonised people in the midst of a free
majority, the portion of them seeming
content with the Union is amazingly small.
It is sometimes argued, glibly, that
Nationalist votes have no meaning;
Nationalist violence alone counts, because
violence alone has any prospect of
achieving Nationalist aims. The
considerable decrease in violence since
1973 is then taken as evidence of a
corresponding waning of Nationalist
feeling among tDe Catholics. It is not
evidence of any such thing.
The rhythm of the Provo war necessarily
changed when it became evident that no
early success was to be expected. They
could not expect to sustain a 20-year
blitz. In the early '70s, on the other
hand, Northern Catholics generally
thought that with 'an intense effort they
could win their United Ireland very
quickly. Taking into account their
disillusion on discovering that it wasn't
so easy - a product of this disillusion
being the Peace Movement - and the acute
dangers they face from armed Unionists,
I think that the combination of military
and political activity which the
Northern Cathoiics h~ve sustained is'
impressive testimony of their unbroken
Nationalist will.
There are two effective choices in
Northern Ireland. It is possible to
continue the status quo, namely the
construction of an apartheid system
with British democracy as its incon-
gruous outer coating. Something could
be said in favour of this course of
action if apartheid could proceed, as
now, without more than sporadic and
containable violence. But, as Harold
McCusker (Fortnight, Jan '83) has
pointed out, this will not be possible
indefinitely. The two communities on
the ground will continue creating facts,
but they are not so positioned that
there can be automatic agreement on just
which facts are to be created. It can
only be a matter of time before some
local conflict sets off a chain reaction.
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Alternatively, it is possible for the
British and Irish governments to plan,
negotiate, win their Northern co-nationals
to accept, and oversee, a thoroughgoing
repartition, inyolving the orderly transfer
of minority communities of Unionists and
Nationalists to those areas where they have
majorities. The outstanding problem is West
Belfast, and I believe that the only disposal
of West Belfast which could be just and
democratic, and would offer hope of peace and
stability, is essentially what is advocated
by Arthur Clery in his article written in
1905 and reprinted in this journ~l.
The idea that there must be one single
political system which both Unionists
(or "ex-Unionists") and Nationalists
(or "Catholics") can fit into dies hard.
Along with the daunting practical diffi-
culties this is the reason why repartition
is not yet discussed in public, though it
is extensively di~cussed in private. But
all the time the communities in Northern
Ireland carry on cr ating facts.
Only a thoroughgoing repartition will work,
and it is tempting to conclude that a
thoroughgoing repartition cannot be achieved
without appalling violence. In fact, it
has a better chance of avoiding appalling
violence than any other political arrangement.
If approached by the two sovereign
governments in th(' spirit of giving each
community justic' it could bring out a
constructive splrit and goodwill towards
settlement in each community. And unlike
those futile "solutions" which require
what is dearest to one or other community
to be trampled on, it would give each
community the essential substance of its
historic demand. It would mean Bits Out
of Ballymurphy, and it would mean No Surrender
in Ballymena.
The DSP has contributed good deal to
public awareness in th Republic that the
Nationalist solution cannot be imposed on
the Unionists. Unfortunately, DSP policy
entirely lacks the other n cessary insight,
that the Unionist solution cannot be im-
posed on the Nationalists. If that insight
also is incorporated into its policy, the
DSP. could bring some badly needed clarity
into discussion of Northern Ireland -
including, perhaps, in the Forum.
- JOHN MINAHANE -
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COMMITMENT OF THE MILLIONS
It took no more than a century, not a long
period historically, for an originally
distant objective to become the reality.
This refers to Marx's vision of a free
association of associated producers, which
in the form of socialist self-management,
originated in Yugoslavia in the 1950's.
Marking the centenary of Marx's death.
Yugoslav communists may justly say with-
out false modesty. or self-content, that
they had historically spearheaded the
materialization of Marx's idea of self-
management.
"The contribution of our revolution to
the Marxist theory and socialist practice
stretches far beyond the mere reaffir-
mation of the 'factory to the workers'
slogan. We were the first to begin to
build up a social!st society in which
self-management spread from the factories
to cover the entire organisation of the
society", said, among other things,
President of the Presidency of the Central
Committee of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) Mitja Ribicic on the
occasion of marking the centenary of
Marx's death.
In recalling that self-management in
Yugoslavia, in spite of all hardships,
has a greater strength than that of an
experiment, that it has its intrinsic
logic and reasonable institutional
structure and that it gives many,
although not all answers to the
questions of future development, Mitja
Ribicic added that "in world proportions"
self-management is the "factor that
cannot be ignored, no matter that it has
not yet become the dominant idea of the
world today, because other ideas also
have their impact and power".
FROM DENIAL TO APPROVAL
What Ribicic said certainly is supported
by the fact that concerning the development
and perspective of contemporary socialism
hardly any other idea than that of self-
management has been the subject of
virtually countless discussions and
debates within the communist and workers'
movement. The idea had been denied in
the beginning some thirty years ago when
its practical application began in
Yugoslavia (explanations such as "do
not nurture delusions," or "do not be
carried away by outdated concepts" were
heard). Today, however, this is the
idea that has grown into the commitm811t:
of the millions, above all because of the
awareness that there is no socialism with-
out democracy, neither democracy without
the full participation of the working men
in the making of all essential decisions
of importance for a society's development ..
Self-management trends, still rather
restricted in volume, are becoming
increasingly present all over the world.
Many of the communist and workers's
parties which had in the beginning denied
self-management, in recent years have
been trying to alter such an attitude as
is seen in a large number of meetings and
studies dedicated to self-management.
Moreover, certain communist parties in
the West refer to self-management as an
orientation even stated in their documents.
In the like manner, some countries with
communist parties .in power also show
mounting interest in self-management and
demonstrate firmer and firmer trends towards
the expansion of direct democracy forms.
For the developing countries, too,
according to debates at the many meetings
on this subject, self-management accounts
for a vigorous process in which they find
encouragement for their overall social
emancipation.
All this, naturally, presents evidence
about the huge diversity: in the
practical materialisation of the idea of
self-management as well as in the
theoretical approach to what is a class
question in the world today. But,
regardless of what is being discussed:
self-management as the 'social relation'
now applied in Yugoslavia alone, or the
varied forms of participation, today
already self-management is not a 'futurist'
idea, for, it is in the different places
that the different-intensity demands for
self-management are being made. Such
demands originate from the different
theoretical sources and rely upon .the
heterogeneous social foundations.
INNUMERABLE STUDIES AND PAPERS
ON SELF-MANAGEMENT
Yugoslavia's historical decision to
embark on the road of self-management,
irrespective of all denials, certainly
did not leave indifferent anybody within
the communist and workers' movement. The
movement's majority readily took the
downright adverse and denying stand,
but there were also others who understood
the "Yugoslav experiment" as an incentive
to reconsider what had been "an almost
forgotten idea." No longer than three
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years after self-management induction,
representatives of some major workers'
parties from the West began to arrive
"to study what is going on in Yugoslavia".
As the communist and workers' movement was
changing its relations, and as the socialist
self-management was achieving results, the
interest in Yugoslavia's experience was
mounting to wide proportions. Statistics
reveal that in the thirty odd years since
the introduction of self-management in
Yugoslavia, more than 250 studies and
about 180 scientific papers hav~ been pub-
lished in over 75 countries in nearly
every major language area across the world.
More than 20 scientists defended their
doctoral theses on the participation of
Yugoslav workers in decision-making.
Countless seminars were held, while
several thousand pages were pUblished
in the newspapers and periodicals about
Yugoslavia's experience in self-
management development.
From among the many books dealing with
the range of Yugoslavia's socialist self-
management, a study by the French author
Yves Durier may be singled out. By
entitling his book: "Tito's Heritage
as the Necessity of Self-Management",
he announced his basic thesis that self-
management is the natural path of
Yugoslavia's development, stemming from
the entire work of Tito's. Having dis-
cussed the plurality of self-management
interests integrated within the socialist
political system, the author concludes
that the different interests at times
display themselves also as crises, that
at times even 'short circuits' or
misunderstandings occur, but all this
only serves him as evidence that self-
management does solve the actual
problems of the society and its
members. It proves that it is not
just a 'model'.
The large mosaic of texts about Yugo-
slavia's experience in self-
management development naturally
pictures the encountered difficulties,
too. "Yugoslavia has not overcome all
problems, but it grapples with them
openly and fearlessly. Contradictions
and internal weaknesses do exist. None-
theless the successes and dynamics
of Yugoslavia's road to socialism
show that decentralisation and
development are not incompatible.
Moreover, Yugoslavia proves that
decentralisation can be the vehicle of
development," wrote the influential
Mexican paper "Novedades".
THE WORLD SATIATED WITH 'MODELS'
Yugoslavia has never regarded its self-
management as a 'model' for other countries.
"All of us are satiated with long-lasting
aspirations to offer 'ideal models'," it
was said a few years ago at the Cavtat
Round-Table Discussions on Self-Management.
"It showed up that a small country can
create its own road to socialism without
simultaneously shutting itself in, but on
the contrary •.• to be able democratically
to solve its inner contradictions and to
interpret the profo~ndly contradicting
and complex present time."
Through its own practice of self-
management, and in spite of all hardships
in the relevant development, Yugoslavia
refuted a theory on "short-lived self-
management." Hence, too, the vast interest
among the world general public in
Yugoslavia's experience and practice of
self-management. This, naturally makes
Yugoslavia particularly responsible before
its own working class and before the whole
world to carry on finding fresh answers
to self-management development as its own
road to socialism, being a community with
the historical mission to take apart the
alienated centres of economic and
political might.
The class-humanist tenor of this
"historical process" was in a simple way
defined by Kardelj in his notable study
"The Directions of Development of the
Political System of Socialist Self-
Management," when he said:
"Neither the State', nor·a system, nor a·
political party can bring one happiness.
Happiness can be created only by oneself •••
This is self-management."
In the turbulent world of ours everybody
is entitled to their own path towards
happiness. Yugoslavia chooses -- self-
management. This is the self-management as
was defined by Tito in his noted address
to the National Assembly of Yugoslavia
when the Law on the introduction of
Workers' Self-Management was enacted on
27 June 1950. "Today we are building
socialism in our country ourselves, without
employing any patterns, but being guided
by Marxist science and following our road,
taking into account the specific conditions
existent in our country ••• "
Self-Management socialism has demonstrated
the untenability of the image of a uniform
model. Its vitality and reputation
depend predominantly on the ability of the
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Yugoslav working class to expand its
range and to reassert its strength -
through the system that has brought about
the emancipation of labour and man. Here,
the objectives'in mind are: the future
development of socialism in Yugoslavia,
and the development of socialism as a
world-wide process.
FIELD DAY
Field Day, a group of poets and playwrlghts
based in Northern Ireland, has recently
issued three pamphlets written by Seamus
Heaney, (An Open Letter), Seamus Deane
(Civilians and Barbarians) and Tom Paulin
(A New Look at the Language Question). The·
common theme is discontent with the cul-
tural relationship of Britain and Ireland.
These authors are very vulnerable to
ridicule. One could easily say that
Tom Paulin is uneasy with the'English
language, Seamus Deane doesn't like Irish
jokes, Seamus Heaney can't stand being
called a Brit, and there are also a few
million people in Ireland whose troubles
are not imaginary. Such a comment is not
adequate, however,
Seamus Heaney has been included in the
Penguin Book of Contemporary British verse,
and he protests in '26 verses that they've
given him the wrong label. He is on terms
of familiarity with the people he
reproaches. His last line reads, "Yours,
Seamus". One feels that the real injury
is this: when they labelled him they
weren't trying to get under his skin, they
were matter-of-factly describing a well-
known part of the British literary scene.
His 26 verses do not really make it clear
why he may not justly be called a British
poet. In calling him British there need
be no question, any more than when the
same description is applied to MacNeice,
of denying the importance of being Irish.
But then MacNeice was a Unionist, and the
recognition of Irishness' which is suffiCient
for a Unionist is not sufficient for Heaney
as a Nationalist. Literature which
elucidates why this is so can be interesting,
but Heaney is really only at the stage of
stating the fact. He did, after all,
develop as a writer during the '60s, when
Ireland was awash with illusions. This
poem of his, bad and all as it is, ~s a
step in the direction of solid ground.
Heaney writes in one of Robert Burns'
favourite verse-forms - with envy no doubt.
Burns was a big hit in London but he didn't.
lose his composure there. If a publisher
had described him in print as a British
poet it would hardly have bothered him;
but most of what he wrote had such an
emphatic national stamp that to call him
anything but "a Scottish poet" would not
be natural. He never developed a crisis
of personal identity: he was as likely to
develop a monastic vocation.
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Of course, the political question was
sorted out for Burns. He could indulge
his heart and glorify Bruce and Wallace
and even Bonnie Prince Charlie; and far
from rubbing salt in old wounds, every-
thing he wrote 'in this manner helped to
cure them. Scotland had already forged
her unique and stimulating relationship
with England. But the relationship of
Ireland, or at least that part of Ireland
to which Heaney belongs, with England, is
intolerable; and aside from some natural
genius, that is the difference between
Heaney and Burns.
Seamus Deane's essay is, thankfully, not
so personal. He argues that for four
centuries the British have seen themselves
as the bearers of civilisation, embodied
in the rule of their particular law. By
contrast they have seen the Irish as bar-
barians to the extent that the rule of
British law does not encompass them.
Illustrating the points, he quotes from
Sir John Davies, Edmund Spenser, Coleridge,
Hazlitt, Horace Walpole and Southey.
In nineteeth century Ireland, "the various
state-run enterprises --- in health, ---
education, --- cartography through the
Ordnance Survey; in policing, --- in law,
--- had a highly Spenserian aim in view -
the civilisation of the wild natives. All
of these schemes were, in effect, pieces of
preventive legisldtion. A whole range of
conditions - like the condition of being
drunk, or illiterate, or from somewhere
unheard of or unknown, or vagrant, or
disaffected - was now realised as being
beyond (not exactly against) the law".
The rise of the modern state system "(dating
from the early nineteenth centure) has
enormously increased the ideological rift
between the competing discourses of the
civilian and the barbarian. ~or the
romantic nationalism which was born in that
utilitarian century gave to certain as-
pects of "barbarism" a privileged status.
In literature, for instance, "barbarism"
became "primitivism" and represented a
Vigour lost to the sophisticated art of
the civilised world. On the other hand,
the same nationalism insisted on the high
degree of civilisation it had attained
socially, although in some of the tem-
perance debates both O'Connell and Davis
give us a version of Irish life which
seems to have been modelled on some of the
more saccharine p ssages in Dickens. The
essential issues have, however, been
"displaced" into literature in such a manner
that their reality has been further
lttenuated --- The audience (of this
literature) --- has learned to be sub-
missive to --- the modern political
machine (which engages in) --- concentrated
manipulation of the --- audience's reaction
to --- the criminal type and, above all,
the politically criminal type, your
friendly neighbourhood terrorist.
This stereotype has all the classic faults
of the barbarian as seen from the view of
the English civilian "
In Deane's view, the H-Block campaign
exhibited this stereotype in its extreme
form, and brought it to the point of
exhaustion. It remains, though, to be
overcome. "Of all the blighting dis-
tinctions which govern our responses and
limit our imaginations at the moment, none
is more potent than this four hundred year
old distinction between civilians and
barbarians. We may well ask, with Bishop
Berkeley in The Querist, whether the
natural phlegm of this island needs any
additional stupefier?"
Unfortunately, Dean has confused the
question he is dealing with. It is a vast
question, and here I will only mention the
most basic deficiencies of Deane's
pamphlet.
The civilians/barbarians distinction is not
four centuries old. It is eight centuries
old. "A rude and untaught people," Pope
Adrian IV called us in the mid-12th
century, and in the famous Laudabiliter
he praised the intentions of Henry 11 "to
enter the island of Ireland to subject that
p ople to laws." Another Pope, Alexander Ill,
wrote three letters to Henry in 1172 on.the
subj ct of Ireland. His main concern was
to get his fair share of the loot, but he
thought that the civilising of the Irish
could not begin too soon: the Irish
"marry their stepmothers and are not ashamed
to have children by them; a man will live
with his brother's wife while the brother is
still alive; one man will live in con-
cubinage with two sisters; and many of
them, putting aside the mother, will marry
the daughters. And all from time to time
eat meat in Lent ---".
Against this distinction of civilians and
barbarians, the Irish forged their dis-
tinction of natives and usurpers (or,
those who are here by ancient right and
those who lately came here by force and
with no right at all). The condition of
Ireland was most eloquently expounded in
these terms by Donald O'Neill, King of
Ulster, in a letter to Pope John XXII in
1317. In the course of a wide-ranging and
-15-
complex argument O'Neill adverted to the
civilians/barbarians view of things and
tried to prove that it had no validity
(See Irish Historical Documents, ed. Curt is
and McDowell) .
This powerful distinction of natives and
usurpers, also, survives to govern res-
ponses and limit imaginations. Although
complicated a great deal by what happened
in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was
available still in the 20th century for the
Irish-Ireland movement (the school of
thought which developed around p.P. Moran's
journal, The Leader) to recharge it with
meaning. Desmond Fennell is the most
considerable present-day exponent of this
thinking. But it is no longer typical
thinking, and this raises an important
question.
When, and in what way, did a shift occur
in Irish psycholo~y making the civilians/
barbarians distinction meaningful to the
Irish? Up to a point, it may have been
meaningful for Hugh O'Neill, the great
Earl of Tyrone. O'Faolain argues that he
recognised the fatal weakness of Gaelic
Ireland, its lack of any principle of
development (The Great O'Neill). Never-
theless, the man who had been educated
at the court of Elizabeth, England's most
glorious monarch, could return to lead
Gaelic Ireland aguinst here in war. There
is no reason to think that, whatever else
it lacked, Gaelic society then had a high
self-esteem which was proof against
English stereotypes.
Only at a much later date did the Irish
assent to the values of modern civil-
isation in its contiguous (English) form.
They asserted with resolution and finality,
but also - as it seems afterwards - with
reservations so deep that almost a century
elapsed before they could ever be voiced.
They became possessed with a special dis-
content, a profound and mysterious resent-
ment which seeps through all the Field
Day pamphlets.
It seems reasonable to take the adoption
of the English language as the crisis of
the development. Language was the passport
to the English way of life in practical
matters, but at the same time as they
adopted the language the Irish rebelled
violently against England in philosophy.
These newcomers to the world of Industrial
Revolution did not merit much dignity
according to any school of thought in-
digenous to that world; on the other hand,
the Catholic religion conf rred dignity on
them unconditionally, once they belonged
to the True Faith. Among many reasons for
the plunge into Catholic enthusiasm, this
is an important one.
Subject, then, to the proviso that the
next world took precedence over this one
and the primary distinction lay between
the True Church and the heretics, one can •
say that the Irish asserted during the 19th
century to the civilian/barbarian stereo-
type of the English. That they assented
in peculiar ways, perverse and irrational
ways to English thinking, is not the point.
That, to English thinking, the more
civilised they became in the sense of
acquiring modern habits, the more they
seemed to regress in the sense of resenting
the English form of government, is also not
the point. They did assent, hastily and
unreflectingly and finally. During the
19th century the Irish were most un-
reflective; only the Anglo-Irish reflected.
Then, at the beginning of the 20th century,
the Irish-Ireland movement reformulated
that old distinction of natives and
usurpers, and they looked back towards the
world of Donald O'Neill with a desolate
feeling, a puzzled resentful sense of
infinite loss.
Much remains to be written about the
frightful century after the Flight of the
Earls; Sean O'Faolaln's biography of
O'Connell (King of the B'ggars) is the
best account available now. That century,
the 18th, is the century of the great
fracture. Between Celtic Ireland and
modern Ireland runs a great fracture that
sends trc "lors of pain down into the present
and will be felt a long way off in the
future.
Dean's view that the 19th century develop-
ments "enormously increased the ideological
rift between the competing discourses of
the civilian and the barbarian", is the
exact opposite of the truth. On the
contrary, the rift disappeared. One
discourse intermeshed with the other. They
continued to be distinct, but for the
first time they communicated. Civility
and barbarism now become, rather than two
uncommunicating discourses, two moments
of the same discourse, two aspects of the
Irish mind. And even in English thinking, •
the Irish henceforward had two aspects:
our neighbours who are becoming civilised/
the Irish at their worst. This trans-
formation and "splitting" of the Irish
personality is observed in Deane's account,
but it is precisely what makes the
cultural relationship of England and
Ir Innd an emotional minefield.
p r pec
PRESENT CRISIS
My view is that a crisis in Irish
politics developed throuRhout the
1970s. One can look back on Irish
history with dismay at the collapse
of promising labour politics in the
late 1920s, and the failure of an
Irish socialism or social denocracy
to develop since. This collapse, and
• t1w raj lurCH of this movement through-
out this century, are our own
~ problcms, problems of the socialist
movement. The same can be said of
the broader secular and liberal .
traditions which also collapsed in
this period. It is no good blaming
the Church or anyone else for this
situation.
But what occurred in the 1970s was
a collapse of the old, self-confident
a~d thoroughly successful philosophy
Of the main body of politics in the
country - Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.
However much one might have opposed
them at the time, or sought to create
a different approach to the country's
. prOblems, it cannot be denied that
these parties fashioned the new
nation in their image and likeness and,
of course, vica versa. When de Valera
said that he had only to look into
his heart to see what the' rest of us
wrre thinking, he was only speaking
the truth.
By the 1970s, the state which these
parties had set up with such zeal
ha~ been established, and th~rgoals
(wlth the exception of the First
~3tional Aim) had been achieved. The
THE FOLLOWING IS A SPEACH GIVEN BY PHILIP O'CONNOR TO A PUBLIC ~EETING
IN TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN, ORGANISED BY THE nUULIN UNIVERSITY DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALIST SOCIETY, ON THE SUBJECT OF "THE WORKERS PARTY AND DEMOCRACY"
• ON NOVEMBER 9th LAST.
I was asked to come along and introduce a discussion on the extent to which
the Workers Party is democratic or not. As a democratic Socialist, this issu
of democracy is of course central to my politics, and in the old socialist
d~bates between Social Democrats and Communists, I side totally and
unequivically with the arguements of the Social Democrats.
While this is an issue which of course does not only concern those in
socialist poli tics, I would still consider it an ."internal" issue of what is
still a small force in Irish politics - the socialist movement. I would like
to make this point clear from the start. While I might have strong criticism
and reservations about the WP, I have an everi stronger affinity with many
elt'ments of that party. I have more in common with the socialist wing of the
WP than I have with, say, any section of Fianna Fail and with most of Fine
Gael. I Ioun PHOl3LEMS parties went to seed. At bottom eve
they were no longer the "forums of
the people" they previously claimed
confidently to be. People were no
longer flocking to them in self-
sacrificing idealism and the 'cream
of the nation', as someone like
Desmond Fennel m~ght put it, were
exercising their talents elsewhere -
usually not in politics at all •
These parties became a hindrance to
the development of the country in
many ways. People in literature and
the arts, a growing liberal tradition
a more rational l~bour movement,
these were all ahead of the parties,
and could only find backward
expression through 'them. What had bee
the vanguard of the nation - the Dail
now became its rearguard. The basic
values of the nation had fundament-
ally altered, but the parties had not
cought up.
Such a crisis could of course only be
of a temporary nature. The 1970s saw
these parties trying to accomodate to
the new rea li ties. Lynch's pseudo-
Social Democracy of the late 70s and
Fine Gael's Social Justice society
were the straws grasped at.
While this crisis continues
essentially, its high point was the
period from mid-19B1 to the end of
1982, from the H-Blocks to the
Referendum. And it was in this
period that a real alternative
presented itself on the stage, with
a number of socialists being elected
to the Dail: the democratic
socialist Jim Kemmy, the republican
socialist Tony Gregory and the half-
way.house between the two of them
-of-fhe-Worker-s-p'arty TDs-.-I am
convinced that the failure of these
deputies to form a cohesive groupin~
in the Dail set this development
way back. This has given time for
FG to regroup and to reappear with
a dynamic image and growing
~credibility as the "new party of
'urban Ireland", and for Dick
Spring to bring the'decline of the
apparat Labour Party to a halt.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY
There is no doubt in my mind that
Jim Kemmy was head and shoulders
above the others in ability and
maturity of outlook. Even in Dublin
at the time, his name became better
known in some working-class areas
than that of Garret Fitzgerald. His
proposal to form an alliance of all,
five deputies caused a sensation
and could have been a turning
point in the emergence of a truely
relevant and vigorous socialist
movement in the country. It was the
cohesion it would have given that
would have been decisive. Gregory
was willing, but the WP was not,
and in the WPs rejection of the
idea was its entire accumulated
history and outlook, which I will
now look at.
SINN FEIN COMMUNISM
The original Sinn Fein movement
,which eventually gave birth to
the WP was one with which few
socialists could have had much in
icommon. It was stridently national-
ist and even at times pro-nazi and
anti-semetic in its past. It was
ardently catholic too - Sean South,
one of Fr Fahy's militants, is
still a hero in some quarters of
the party. In the late 1960s, some
British Communist Party intelect-
uals saw the emerging national
conflict in Northern Ireland as a
great opportunity to launch a
social nationalist movement and
to dream of a Vietnam-style
development for the quaint island.
The "social wing" of the movement
grew in strenght, especially a~ter
Official Sinn Fein called off ltS
I war effort in 1973. More and more,
,socialists joined the party as
the best vehicle available for
socialist advancement in Ireland.
Throughout the 1970s, the basic
conflict in the party was between
,the nationalist wing and the new
socialist wing. The nationalists
were still organised along
conspiratorial lines, backed up by
' the ominous Army Council. In
,taking on this old structure, the
L I
socialists also organised along
similarly secretive and conspir-
'atorial lines - backed up by the
so-called "Industrial Section"
organised by Eoin Harris and
Eamon Smullen.The name-change to
Sinn Fein - The Workers Party in
1977 was the first major break-
through for the "new liners" as
they were then known. The growing
strenght of the new wing, especially
as the party's growing electoral
successes were obviously a result
of its new politics, saw the final
change to THE WORKERS PARTY in
1982.
GENUINE CHANGE
The internal conflicts, debates
and contradictions were not of
course that straight-forward or
simple. There were - and still are -
a multiplicity of factions, groups
and alliances in the party. And the
rise of the New Socialism has
infected the party thoroughly,
and in the process various formerly
contradictory outlooks have
amalgamated and given their
~stamp to the new programme. People
like Prionsias de Rossa and Tomas
McGiolla have genuinely developed
in their outlook and politics and
cannot be looked at.si~ply as .
ationalists in sOClallst clothlng.
¥ndeed nothing could betfarttherfrom tfie truth 01 the sl_ua~on.
- The rise-of socialism-in the I;larty
has increasingly meant a partlcular
kind of socialism, one that finds
itself at home with many.a~pects of
the more traditional POll~lC~ of the
party. The democratic soclal:sts
who played a prominent pa:t ln the
transit-ion of the seventles are now
little in evidence. The party's
socialism has become increasingly
identified with many who were
formerly the backbone of the. .
nationalist rearguard. It was lronlC
that the re-organisat~on of.the party
which took place earller thlS Year,
and which was heralded at the time
as the "democratisation" of the
party has basically not only
cemented the leninism (or "democratic
centralism") of it, but also seen
a retrenchment of the "old liners"
in power. The two committees
established to organise and run the
party are dominated by former old-
line members. The socialism of the
emerging WP is ever more that of
a communist party. The party machine
is one which 'educates' new members,
expels "erring" ones and vilifies
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:!•.l'G ~;::: ~.~ '.:::0 \·.'cu:~cl cl:".im to be
c:-: 1:1':8 :'!:r·.:'dlefV' \'!1~8 nIso sub-
s(~rjl~e ·~o t11is most anti-
tl!(:o~:8i.:ic:,.1 oX all r-h:!.losophical
\TiQ·:/.:J('ii!"l ~s'~
L:h. ': '.. 1, :'.'
Many social democratic supporters
of the WP sec'this type of talk as mer~
"rhetoric", claiming that in its
practice the WP is essentially
"labourist". The rhetoric should not be
taken too seriously, they argue. There
is no doubt however, that the increas-
ing use of s'..tch rhetoric .- :l:1d practicf_
I wOll!_d :~:q,;'~,e .- h:ts gi \fen :12\'/ spiri t an
gusto to the thec~eLicians oC the party
The publishing cl.: Cl.;].ss Politics - a ty
o:!.' Irist 1,1al'xis::. '~'-:;;;.::"'/ - is ~'. significC3
develo[.;1:8nt in i :;s3~i~ In the i3di toriaJ
of the i.':!..::·2t ':'2SU~: 3:~itOl' Des O'Hagen
states t::~~:~ tl~.:; 17"::::.g:-.zir.e ir~tends to
reSC~:3 t!r..:·;·:is:"'! :c::':)"':' "vnl~a!' Marxism,
'..:::.t:::r..-:~(~!: (,;is~. d:)r;~T.:,..tism and cultism".
But this task is ~ot ~ithout its problE
::,.pparc~ltJ.y;
"Rescl~ing the ! rish revol utionary
tradition from the bloody grip of
fascist and ultraleftist Inter- I
prctutions is of particular
ur~ency in the light of claims
put Ior"':urd by nco··fascists anel
troLsLyists, to be within that
t ra.di t ion. \'/():!:!~ 0 l' tha t' nature
has long s~nce needed to be
und8rtaken in truely Mu.rxian
f2shion, h~vi~Z ~8~ard for the
po:liticc-~1ist'.: r'.~cG'.J, context
\'/il~'ir: r;hidl !:hn I)'ll:;h rovolut-
:~on::.:·.~ :l~~.. ~_lj:.; :-::~ ~.I}~ .. S rO!·~!,8( .!!ere
IS NOTHING!
'i'HE PAHTY IS ALL ANn TIlE ~10VEMENT
"trotskyites". ~fany people might
say, "well, .50 what?, it's about
time that wc had a well-org:anised
ef!pctive party of the left in
Ireland".
"WOH1\: I NG-CLi\SS PAllTY"
ThuS, policies, outlook and political
development are subordinhtcd to the
PARTY. The central leninist thesis ~s
that what is bood for ~he party is
"ubjectivl"ly" good for the peo~J10.
Even if something is obviously
pro~ressive in itself, but independent
or" the party, it will be fought (the
"trotskyist" Anti-i\mendment Campaign).
Th~ WP's hostility to the AAC was
lund:tml~nta.l to i.ts outlook, as was
its wa.rn ing to Dub 1 in members not
to g~t involved because of the type
of "eh>mLnts" associated with the
ca.mp:' ign. Disrega rdlng tho poli t ieal
mp1'its of holding an effective Dail
balance of power, de Rossa was
S~)sequently disarmingly honest
WIll'a he outlined the reason [or the
WP l'l'j e~ t ing an all ia nee: "We are
not looking to get people to join
Jim Kl'mmy' s party or the IRSP".
l0.:.~:~Jt.on interview, Oct/Nov 1983).
Prionsias de Rossa is the party's
most impressive public figure, ano.
no doubt its future leader. He has
on several occasions outl~ned th8
basic outlook of the WP, and
should be taken special note of.
lie annunclates in the clearest
fashion the belief that what is
needed is for the Party to get
into Pow~r, and in the process
the main aim of tax equity campaigns
is not so much to achieve reforms of
-;';:Il' ~ys~l':.• ;~s to "1'a1::;0 class
c~)n::;ci0usn8ss". The sume not t i. t uC:('
f"hp n:1 i 1 was ltlso n f:.'l.etor j n
di~l~lissing the idea of an effective
alllance. But people in Ireland
and are more impressed by results
and this type of politics of '
d~s~~n~ent ~ill fi~d it has a very
llmlC(;Q 2.~)Cstttl;cncy ir. the long run.'!
De Rossa des8ri~es the WP as a '
"revolutiona.ry p2.rty"; aiming at
Eduard Bernstein, one of the great "transJerr'ing power from the
social democratic theoreticians, once capt tal ist class to the wor~ing class·!
said that "the movement is all and the The objective of this party, Rccording
cnd is nothing". By this he meant to de Rossa, is to "establish a
concentration on the gradual socialist democratic republic", somethi
improvement of society within a genera]which "it's not possible to do ....
outJook and perspective, and the futurEthrough a social domocratic party".
will ta!,e care of itself. TIH~ communist
outlook is the exact opposite of this.
The "l11o\'el11cn t" becomes a tool towards
the glorious end of an ill-defined
"socialism". For the movement to stay
on the rails, a leninist would argue,
it cannot be trusted to its own
ins~inc~s and abilities, but is
displaced by the "disciplined" PARTY
as the exclussively legitimate





~r~~ ..;I~<.lU_~ .. ". .' .-i." :': .. ' .•.... , , '.
1. 'Phc tn:::L v': .d .... ;j ~il1l! c~, 'l-.iing- lan<l
s:lould be a pl_::;-.ing decision. Sue:l' ':l
task is in tegraJ- to the demoertltlr.
planning process and is beyon~ the
professional competence of the iudic-
iary. This task of defining sho~ld r.o
therefore be a judicial decisi(')n.
For legal purposes, bUilding 1an~
~h0uld be defined simply as all lane
wr,i. h is zoned for t!'.~ purl1Use in a
vevelopment Plan , inclUding lan~ which
is already bu i 1 t o~ ~ .-..---
S1.1r h a definiti.G' .vou/le'. .1. .. ~vrpor!lte al
lar,rl within a built-up area an We'll ~~
l~~d zoned ~~~ building purpos~~ on
t~p fring~ T~e ~r0ti~ems creat~a ~y ~~
,'ncontrolled market ~.i bUildir.g land
occur just a~ I 'Ll~~. iil ~Ul1 ~: ..'¥" ,,E l)ar.
districts whp,_ M~e ~~~_C-" ~~. ~~nd
's~eculation can lead ~o widespre~J
1o~r]i('tio"'.
'2. 'i,; .. ..: pril1c~I).l~ 0.1 r~.l8.+l.ng thc'pr'l-~~
of property to its currenl: U5~ "'r.~~_"':
is central to any at tempt to hr:';.~
about a ration~l market in buiJuing"
land.
The Kenny Committee's recommer.dal".ion t
.:...ollpensate landowners for "use VI.! 1 1..:,
pILlS 251>" needs, h()\I1c>'.':r .- OP Jodif'iE
The 25% differential need not ho ~:;lifo
Any such differential Should ~~-t~~rl t
uetermined on principles analogous ~~
those obtaining to workers "he' arc ~aG
-';dundant, ie lenght. of tenure,
replacement cost and ayailability of
suitable alternative properties are,
examples of the factors which should b
taken into account in determining the
differentials.
3. Any steps taken to increase the use
value of land about to r
SUbSf'''llent T'(') a Not·,..", t'"
be ignored in determining
. compensation payable.
. -
E. It has been suggested that measures t
relate. the price of bUildiRg land 1 1 1
use-value might be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds tt t
they would discriminate-between t
owners of L~ila1ng land and owner
other, mainly agricultural, land,
It must be pointed out however, t. t tt
ng n uepce on e_ The important eature n e er
. planninJ; process. Planning .4-,.still -option is that the State would
_ the mosl:_important fune! ~Q~-l~f-.t - -. - -hold th,e ri~ht to acquire.
-to" local' go.ve!n~en.t. -:. - ~~: ~ ~ -~_~_ _ possess ion of bui ldin~ ~,anri ·....11en
.- and where required Q. \, a, ~r;ic~, tha~t,
4. It is unjust that th~-~G~lth would r~flect existi1 6 use value.
"-<.rea-tecd- by expanding comnmni.t :t"es·,
in' the -fcrm-g T ,?1'~i9 investment-· - D. The DSP eel i.evr.>s, therefore, that
i.l ph..ysic{~Tintr·~:;truc·ture'such tbe Kenny 'Committee"s majority:
as ro_ads ~.... t\,: o:>::w:,.';=-. shoul1.·accrue recommenda ... .1.Vll ;:01..:1'"' 'form Ll)e'.
in landfa-ll-f,9:shion to a tiny·... basis of an ·acceptable solution to
-nlinori.ty of f_ort-unate lan.go~Iler8w thp., PJ"oblem, ~rovided that the
fo-:::VWl.rl~~:i.lIi~,:,lrt~nt m()(iifi.~aticns •H,)llsin~ is a basic ri.:f',llt ·01' all-
'I~~'son:::;, ,1 t. shau lrr t hoiefofe be'
n ..... ue' .;" . .l.llilble 'to ...l.x.' '1'1".. ~ J:5r,i~e
which does not lnclude a marg1n or
undue profitability.
5. Speculation in urban land if; a
principle cause of derelicl".~un,. a
scandalous process of abuse alld
underuse of anexL~emely val~able
~nd important resource.
~ny steps which are take~ to
tackle these obvious social
injustices must. ~~c0~~L~gly, m et
~' : f 011 ow i n r>; ',::, 0 ,n C t 1 '" ......
:t' The cost of bUilding lanct t.o
'the COlnr.''',·d':'Li at large and to
-+:;,0 indi"iG~aJ.. :lUu::;ebu:,pr mu-.>t be
reduced..
b) Tlh" oppOrl.Ull':'~J f~r .::;~C',I.. latloP..
in buildin ..... :'.c .~, r~~~'. t .... rr;r..Qvcd.
This Deans that th~ e~cessive
"::~~r- __-::-: :"0' .':-L', ~:..... ~.Y~::'ce
of ~~,,~.:. '.' .... r- .,").;' ~ .... ri il·~"'·:._:.:1tural
land must ~e reduce~, ;~ well as
the equally excessive differentlul
l.letween the various categoI'~I~S of
building land.
c) Whore a local a~~horl~YI or any
n \1('1' public body, ::'nvcsts l.~
infrastructure, it is they who
s!lOuld recoup thel)(~·I~"\.·'ilt vf th?
in\' est 1:1 C n t .
~.L) Tho reasons given by the
K~"nl1\' -Committee for the rejecti.on
0: most of the o~tions cons~dered
b\' it are soun-d. Opt iOl! B; _
however, on the nationalisaXio.n ef
all building land and payment of
eOF.1pc'nsa t ton I is d i:::;missed too
hi i b r\' .
- I t w:~ no t necessary. for pxamp le,
fOl' the Committee to assume that
all building land wou'~ ~eed to'be
n'lt';(')n" ')" cod anr! 'Amnnnc:;at: -·n ,\:-. ...
.... (.\, - -) .
paid for it, in an instant.
Furthermore, the problem of
, _ defining- what is building land
must also be faced if certain
o'ther options are chosen, including
the option ~avoured in the majority
report.
2) In es~en"'o, ;~ ~"~7 case, the
option chosen by the majority







price of agricultural land is in fact
very closely relate9 to its use-value,
and that jt rise~ ~n~ !~lls according as -
farm incomes ~ise and fall ..
The effect of our proposals would merely
be to extend the principle of use-value
to all markets in land.
F. The "Democratic Socialist
Party believes, therefore, tha1
there are no impossible
. \,J 3t ac .lP~ ,-v ',ne impJ ~1I1entat ion
of it~ p~oposals other, perhaps,
than _the la~k of the political
·will necessary to their
introduction.-The. Pafty calls,
a~cordingly, fQr the Oireachtas
Sub-Committee on Building Land
to rcco~nend.the adoption of
these proposals, an& for the





{ 'THiS ARTICLE IS A COpy OF THE-- i
I,
}I~~~ D~~FT·ONLY OF THE DSP ,
-- ~UBMISSION TO THE OIREACHTAS
rC;0AITTEE. DUE TO RECENTi [l'F"TELOPMENTS IN THE CONTROVERSY
srJRROU1-iI!ING THE KENNY REPORT,
I THE; uLJJjMI~S.1.vl'i 111\::> wL.t.l'~ .a~,","'l.1"-IED··I·· :. THY:; !'it.A.I.' r:'..:.J:-: 0:"dl~ U.td\'JlJ\"'hhT~L:
I SO~IALI~'!' llT,T'LL CARRY DETAILS or. TIlli·-AMEI~JJ .. c,·as. I
"FIEUJ L.i:,Y" REVJFW - rontd from p:"'15:
Politics brings rancour in~o all thes~
argu,nents - i ,.,tn T)eane I s pamphlet toe.
Field uny cOffiprises the main Northern
writers who fall on the Nationalist side
of tl..; -hake-out; hence it is inevitahle
that L~lese pan,phlets should have a r.ationa:i.ist
leaning. If they simply decided that ~hcy
want to clarify ineas for a nationalist
audience, rather than a British Isles
audier~~, they might shed more light.









POLITICS AND "RiGOROUS A~~ALYSIsr1' D. ~:J:; '- (q l-t;.side Limerick) .t 0 a politicalsec-':.-;I::_ca;:·lt help-thinking that DRve.,
_ ,lvey'wo.·;.:(ln~t thin~: ".'lch '" ~.L ~_, 0 .eve CP1~t::.1"
a1-1; g_ ,'.e bad thi:u,:.:..>
~ ,Io"old "'like, if I may, t9 Li1.1r,E;.; -.rOt:le bric"
. c.'eunents' on'D'ave 1\.lvey i s article I Prop-:
<1':'=~':~ &. ~'lra' j ,rr:' in.. +~~ -:;.:~ond i33-\;..~ .01:
'T'.II~ D.~;.:CC":L·WIC SCCIA.uIST. -
If ";i.l.r _=ar-ty is to grow..{never mind get
J ocal A':1d nat~O!]-al publi~ representatives
el p ......,.od '0"''--1'' J .1' . TT ,. ,_,-, _ - ~1r:: ,.0 ... " J.'- '" :J:lY) ,1;r:en en ergo ,..... ~ I<;13c~0_~\1 ·""0J.~ .:; _~r""~-"";,v ..... +- nt">co~:..' ,~ .7;) ........ __ \04 •
~.l..l.~ .\.,.. .. ~~,o ~C" ~ .e ..... .l..Y u cY'·;+';c.i-- '.--""1 ./ c - ::; .·~r+ ~")'r C .:j+ ...... - .... .;~-, ve- , ....
..... c... ,~ __ ..., __ ~ .L J:l tJ ~ ~,~. .~..... _.... ... - v -' - • ~ ~ .::)
od 1; sone articles (uu~ of which, he :;;£Q+,ej -fr.rt;a1.is-4-:~.-: a+,t~tude ~o th" ':l~rke:ts l-arty.
Iwhich appeared recen~ly in th= local D.:.:? ppaper the DUN LAOGHAI3E TRIBITrE. Dave A:v~~ he DoS:_: nay ?r May no~ suceed L':1 cutt~>6! rej ects the charge made by some Party mem- ,out an In_J uent,~3l place in Irish Parlia-
bers t~t the articles in questio:l f~vO\)""eJ. ~p.n+,:ry ~oli~i:es -, wl:'.-:lt. is cPrt3~n.,if' \Ve
.respec+,~vely,theWo:-kers Parf;y and the opt 0 ~]t. on ,he s1.de ,1Jnes drc:n:me-out
"
Labour Party and t.hat therefore they ShOUllr' ~r(,:1?-~J.~es Of, "irery rJ,gorous Cl.u'\lysis" ,
n'~ ~:; been published in an essentially :hp. D.), • w?n t .play any role in cr.nng-
I :J ,)p·w~l\u.ist Party periodical. J..r)~ or con-!;J 1 butme to Irish socip<",:;y.
II· his reply,Alvey states th~.t CC- the n.3.~o Fr,d;ernnlJJ-'
1-'3 c, """"putation for ~r~ (1"";:':1!; 11 0 0 1 ',':"-::te3 I
·.vl~~~· -inhibLedly discuss a given polj-l;. -
.I.. ;?1 sktuation", :J:k :?urt,yl s propag3.'1.da
~~"'vU'I' " ••• tole::"?"':c .n.J. 'lcuU!'age oropag-
r~.C1< which aspires to obj e~"':~--.·; analysis"
.J • ......:1 when it reflecr... 'u ~1.:':; ~ Ci~~ 1') "':.:?.
r 'II,..;'d have no qualr.ls in agre " >5 with
\,- .\.., ........ .;:.p + ""r' T'\
~.~ in "")(t ,.' .. { ..... "" ... r • f :jr-i ....-;........'. 1·, .......... 1 ~l·.
:,ropa:..> mdist newsl~t.!;er lik~ the : ~ORZ
or F..:E3 FHESS. As ~h'J b;:;nch in nues.\;ic:·dc~~'~,'!;hen the '~I3mr2 is obliged to'
f'.llfill the licitel bu.\; necessary role of
S(~~~v pUblishising the Party anci i~~
no' ·cies. I He ~as raised impo;tant points
:ab,:'lll- vuoI' product i vi ty in the
Indeed,I Vlould h8,{8 thoug' 1• .;~,e ",:...:' ;::t.gr1cultural sector and t~ ..... !':.2 -..' ~r1"
tLl' __ .JJ:l ~ozhaire clJ,{ls~i-l;ue:lcj' provided ":11S'J.bst~'1Hal reform. But his article
1:9. <>. wHh a creJi.!; '01,:- vo.!;e in ':he 1-·,::.. c~~ta]r..s an ~sse::ti<:>n ~hich is simply
I
gener 1 elec';.icn would .onl~r u.r.":; ~rli."ill +he _j~I '- ng an? Wh1ch 1 t 1S 1mnortant to
nece"si"ty, urgency a'1d v.?ll--~ 0': push:ipg ":"~ I:?~::ec:. 1f w~ are to f<:>rmula te a
,,.,,..._. "'~ o.c +.;'p ~8.""t. .• -,I- ev~Y''' oO""'1.'b'=-- ~"".l-10n ..... _ pOl1Cy on agr1cul r uralv~ .... J""'-";..;:'I ..L J 1. ... ., .r .... l:t <. . , ..... - J .. _ ~:tv _ ..L.__ _ _ ~ •
occasion.' - :~- - .=-. He states that "farmers have
. '. " ,enricl1' d themselves by doing next to
:Bu~ per1"..aps we.. can.. best unde:-s-t n what ~3 nothing". He also says that m t f
b ' . d T\ 'I r th'" h d I os 0enl.n ...,ave 'r.. vey s J.0JC~'1.g w••en we rea fhe EEC agriculture- budO'et '
fu "'"h . hi t' 1 hi .. I' t. l:) 1S.I. r J _~r ~:I:P-_ s, ar ,~c, e, 3 c r.. >:!.'ac ~c ,or: devoted to "making sure farmers
COT:'.nents on wl-.at ne considers should be ave a 'decent' income regardless of
D.S.P. strategy. . ow hard they work and even if '-}1pv
_ 'du not work l'lt all"
While saying,on -+;he me ha'1.d,that :in ".···l '
the areas where the D.S. P. has established The Agr1,:yl:tural Inst i tute' s
a pre§ence.in electoral work~ •• +his should ~a::m Management .Surve for 1981 has·
be .. ccntinued and build on" ,nevertheless, th1S. t~ say on farm incomes in that
since the Party has oi3,ed the bus,D.S.P. ear., In all provinces except Uuns-t.r
members should " ••• devo~e less energy to he h1ghest proportion of full time
electoral work". The end result of arms fell into the £2 000 - 3 000
such' a policy would inevitably reduce the category (munster's being the -' ...
I
, IR£3,000 ~ 4,000 b ... ouPJ anO ~nen
_ ' _ 'udged against income distributic
~ or any other sector of the work





low level of achievement. It points
to a situation where for many farms,
'standards of living would be mi
miserably low without income
supports from outside farming".
The Institute also says that "The
real value of the 1981 average family
income per farm was still about 40~
below the 1978 level" (Counting farm
incomes only).
That is not enrichment. And it
is nonsense to suggest that farmers
are provided with a decent income
"even if they do not work at all".
A farmer who does not work at all
will have no income at all unless
he lives in one of those counties
in which the farmer's dole is
payable, and that is means-
tested in the case of new applicants.
The old system which abolished the
means-test for farmers in certain
counties is itself being abolished
at present. And of course, the
scheme only existed in a minority
of counties.
As for the assertion that
farmers have been doing"next to
nothing", the Agricultural Institute
has estimated that milk production
has increased by nearly 50% in the
past decade, although the amount of
land devoted to it has declined
slightly. And according to John
Mordy's figures - Table 1 in his
~
article - net agricultural output
increased by 17% (31% gross)
between 1970 and 1981 ..
That was during a period when
we went through one recession and
the start of another, when inflation
soared and when interest rates
went through the roof. Of course
agriculture should have done a great
deal betterduring the decade - but
to accuse farmers of doing "next
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Between the last two world wars
it was assumed that the new strategic
weapon was the airplane. That
assumption was wrong. It was the
tank. A few military planners saw
the value of the tank correctly,
but with one exception were not
taken seriously before June 1940,
after the fall of France to the
Nazis. "Boney" Fuller and Liddel
Hart in Britain, de Gaulle in
France and Heinz Guderian in
Germany were the tank specialists
in the 1930's. By a fluke,
Guderian's plans for a massed
armour invasion of France, through
the Ardennes, came to Hitler's
notice, and was approved. This
strategy of concentrating tank
armour was what led to the
demolition of the French army in
three weeks, and this despite the
fact that the German High Command
disliked the plan and kept
trying to dilute it, and even
Hitler wavered in its execution,
at Dunkirk and later in Alsasse .
All of the decisive battles of
World War 2 were tank battles. It
isn't that the airplane wasn't
important, but that the capacity
to get beyond static warfare and
allow scope for strategic flair
was su~plied by tanks. One of the
more interesting aspects of
this story is that both the
military specialists and the
disarmers got it wrong.The
prevailing orthodoxy up to June
1940 was that armies would
qUickly bog down into trench war-
fare, and that the cities behind
the lines would be absolutely
destroyed with their populations
by air raids. William Plummer
summed up the politics of it in
his poem "Between the Wars":
'The belief that we should
disarm
and at the same time fight,
And that Moscow, ofall places
was the sole source of light'.
WORLD WAR III
Very similar attitudes are
prevelent today. The likely defeat
of Western Europe's armies in a
war with the USSR in Europe, and
25
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As said above, while our
conventional ~o~pes are no match
EUROPE'S ROLE
Without any doubt that defence
must relate to the Soviet Union.
And there is much to be defended in
Western Europe; political democracy
freedom of th individual and of
the press, independent trade unions
and political parties etc. ~ll of
these items were central planks
in the socialist movement's
platforms prior to 1914. They are
just as important to us today.
The calls for disarmament which
don't tackle the question of how
we should defend ourselves can at
best only be described as weak-
minded and at worst as a Soviet
inspired propaganda exercise. A
state which wants to continue to
exist must be prepared to fight for
its own existance in a world of
political conflict. The absense of
this willingness to defend itself
acts as an' invitation to other
states to mop it up, and could be
far more disruptive of the peace
than the armed detterent. A
Western Europe distanced from the
US would have certain progressive
effects and advantages. The .
European political tradition would
be seen as quite different from and
healthier than the US's, a more
effective brake could be put on
America's interference in 3rd
World national liberation struggles
and that sort of Europe could
seriously act as 'honest broker'
to the two superpowers.
These things could develop in
a Europe independent of America,
but only of course if we can
defend ourselves.
WHICH WEAPONS?
The escalation to nuclear
we~pons, the maintaining of the
right to 'first strike' are all
dependent on the view that the
West's conventional forces would
be defeated.
To some extent this strategy
had already become unbelievable in
the early 1970's. After the US's
defeat in Vietnam, Nixon's
impeachment, and milksops like
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter in
the White House, who could believe
that the American President had
the bottle to push the button.
anu the horror of imagining the Naturally enough, the military
results of a nuclear exchange, hav planners started to produce
led the military strategists alternative strategies - this after
(although this isn't true of all all is what they are paid to do.
of them) to a greater reliance on Enter theatre and tactical nuclear
their nuclear armoury, and the weapons, and continued nuclear war
peace campaign to a defeatist Iscenarios.
position. Both sides are agreed on Th g t st d ft' th
. , . e rea e e ec ln ese
the absolute stra"teglc lmportance strat g' f E t de les rom a uropean s an -
of the nuclear bomb, and the commo p 'nt' th t th k 't
scenario for World War III goes I d?~f' lSlt t
a ~y mal e 1 ~edryl'k th' , 1 lCU 0 serl0us y consl er~t: l~sinvasion of the North European defence without ~he US.
-:::--.........p-. , . But a Europe that was serl0uslyGerman Plaln by masslvely superlo 't t d' l't' I 't
tank divisions of the USSR. I ln eres e ln po 1 lca un~ ~ ,
St 2 B f f' I d f t f Iwould have to take responslbllltyep . e ore ,lna e,ea 0 for its own defence.
Western conventl0nal forces,
threats or actual use of theatre
or tactical nuclear weapons.
Step 3. Escalation to full nuclea
exchange, or not depending on
your side of the fence, and or
climbdown by one of the beligernt
It must be said that the defeat
of the West's armies envisaged in I
Step 2 is never officially I
admitted, but given the West's I
inferiority in material, its I
problems with reaction time and
co-operation between different
national armies, and the required
American atombic jump, that defeat
is more than likely. Many other
variants can be introduced into
this war game, including one or
other side deciding early to get
the jump on the other and deciding
~o skip a step in the game and go
straight for the big guns. All of
these are possible but beyond the "
realm of cogent thought.
Interestingly enough, General .
's solution in his book i
the "Third World War" depends on al
revolution in Eastern Europe to
allow the West to Win. Not some-
thing one would want to rely on!
US TRADITIONAL ROLE
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